


# Threat Modeling

SecAppDev March 2016  
by Jim DeGrosso

# whoami

- Run Cigital's Architecture Analysis practice
  - 30+ years in software development in many different domains
  - 15+ years focusing on software security
- 
- Executive Director of IEEE Computer Society CSD initiative

<http://cybersecurity.ieee.org/center-for-secure-design/>



@jimdelgrosso

# What Is Threat Modeling?

- A software design analysis capable of finding flaws
- A defect discovery technique that is part of your SSI
  - You do have an SSI, right?

# Threat Modeling Vocabulary

Asset

Likelihood

Security Control

Impact

Threat Agent

Mitigation

Attack Surface

Traceability Matrix

Threat




# Threat Model Process

- Define scope and depth of analysis
- Gain understanding of what is being modeled
- Model the attack possibilities
- Interpret the threat model
- Create the Traceability Matrix

# System Threat Model

Characteristics of the System Threat Model include:

- Holistic view of application's security posture
- Considers both application and infrastructure
- Builds roadmap for additional security activities




# Protocol/Sequence/API Threat Model

## Protocol/Sequence/API Threat Model

Characteristics include:

- Analysis of message structure and component interaction



# System Threat Models

# Decompose and Model the System




- Understand how the system works (before trying to break it)
  - Who uses the system
  - What are the business goals
  - What are the dependencies between systems
    - What systems (components) does this system make use of
    - What systems (components) use this system
- Review (some) development documentation
- Interview members of various teams

# Gain Understanding from Interviews


From the interview, you learn:

- Social-networking application; accepts payment
- Some content and features membership-only; some, free
- App is JavaEE app; uses WebLogic as JavaEE container
- Backend database is Oracle
  - Stores user's preferences
  - Produces some membership-only reports
- Web UI built using JQuery JavaScript library
- Web UI calls third-party REST services for user-specific content
- User connectivity and interface to backend services uses HTTPS

# Diagrams from Development/Infrastructure Teams




# Layer Model (from Development)






# Logical Model (from Development)



# Deployment Model (from Infrastructure)



# Modeling the System Structure

Based on the interviews and development/infrastructure diagrams, create a model that shows:

- Which components are in-scope for this “release”
- How control flows between these components
- How components and flows relate to host boundaries and network zones
- Application layer communication protocols that connect components


Model can use an existing diagram or one you create:

- For this class, we’ll create our own

# Simplified System Model

Components come from the Logical and Layer Models

Machine boundaries come from the Deployment Model



# Modeling the Attack Possibilities

To model the attack possibilities, continue to analyze the information we've collected in our interviews. And now add the related threat model elements:

<b>Assets</b>	Data and functionality that the system must protect
<b>Security Controls</b>	Mechanisms currently designed and implemented to protect the Assets
<b>Threat Agents</b>	Actors that want to harm the system

Juxtaposing the attack possibilities and the system creates the actual threat model. Interpreting the model produces a list of potential attacks.

# Identifying Assets from Interviews

Information collected in development interviews:


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# Identifying Assets from Interviews

Information collected in development interviews:

- Social-networking application; accepts payment
- Some content **[A01]** and features **[A02]** membership-only; some, free
- App is JavaEE app; uses WebLogic as JavaEE container
- Backend database is Oracle
  - Stores user's preferences **[A05]**
  - Produces some membership-only reports
- Web UI built using JQuery JavaScript library
- Web UI calls third-party REST services **[A04]** for user-specific content
- User connectivity and interface to backend services uses HTTPS

# Model the Attack Possibilities: Assets





# Identifying Controls from Interviews

Information collected in development interviews:


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# Identifying Controls from Interviews

Information collected in development interviews:

- Social-networking application; accepts payment
- Some content and features membership-only **[C01][C02]**; some, free
- App is JavaEE app; uses WebLogic as JavaEE container
- Web UI built using JQuery JavaScript library
- Web UI calls third-party REST services for user-specific content
- Backend database is Oracle
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- User connectivity and interface to backend services uses HTTPS **[C03]**

# Model the Attack Possibilities: Security Controls



# Identify Threat Agents

Threat agents are primarily based on access. To identify threat agents:

- Start with the canonical threat agents for the software
- Associate the threat agent with system components they directly interact with
- Minimize the number of threat agents by treating them as equivalence classes
  - For example, assume a technically sophisticated threat agent and a script-kiddie are the same
- Assume that a threat agent can be motivated to attack the system
  - Consider motivation when evaluating likelihood

# System TM Canonical Threat Agents

Most internet-based applications can start using canonical set of threat agents:

1. Unauthorized External, Internet-based Attacker
2. Unauthorized Internal/External (client-side), LAN-based Attacker
3. Authorized External, Malicious User
4. Authorized Internal, Malicious App/System Admin


Cloud-hosted applications should account for:

5. Authorized Malicious Cloud Provider Admin

Mobile client applications should account for:

6. Malware on a Jailbroken/Rooted device

# Model the Attack Possibilities: Threat Agents




## Interpret the Threat Model

To interpret the threat model, start with threat agent and follow flow-of-control paths to reach an asset:

- Is there any path where threat agent can reach asset without going through a control?
- For any security control along each of those paths:
  - What must threat agent do to defeat the control?
  - Can threat agent defeat the control?

Record missing or weak controls in the traceability matrix

# Interpret the Threat Model (In-Class)



## Assets

A01 – Member-only Content  
 A02 – Member-only Features  
 A03 – Payment Information  
 A04 – Partner Credit API  
 A05 – Customer Profiles  
 A06 – Session ID  
 A07 – DB Access Credentials  
 A08 – SSL private keys

## Threat Agents

TA01 – External, Internet-based  
 TA02 – External, LAN-based  
 TA03 – Malicious User  
 TA04 – Malicious App/System Admin

## Controls

C01 – User Authentication  
 C02 – Member-only Authorization  
 C03 – SSL/TLS  
 C04 – Single Sign-On  
 C05 – File System Access Control  
 C06 – DB Schema Authorization  
 C07 – Partner Account Authentication



# System Threat Model Lab



# System Threat Model Lab: Objectives

Lab objectives:

- Reinforce what you just learned
- Build a complete threat model with optional diagram for a fictitious system
- Work in independent groups
  - Even with a defined process, people come up with different threat models
  - The models converge over time but is not likely to happen right away

# System Threat Model Lab: Model the System

To model the system:

- Receive and review all artifacts
- Review the interview notes made by your colleague
- Create a component diagram
  - OK to "flag" assets, controls, etc. in handouts
  - **Only draw a component diagram now!!**

Duration: 60 minutes (includes 15 min. to review)

# System Threat Model Lab: Review System Models

Let's review the system models:

- How different was each group's interpretation of the system?
- What areas were identified where you need to get additional information?

# System Threat Model Lab: Add Assets and Threat Agents

Base your work on **ONLY** the provided system model diagram!

Add attack possibilities to the model:

- Assets
- Threat agents

Duration: 30 minutes (includes 10 min. to review)

# System Threat Model Lab: Add Security Controls

Base your work on ONLY the provided system model diagram!

Add attack possibilities to the model:

- Security controls
- Controls added should ONLY be based on documents received from client

Duration: 45 minutes (includes 20 min. to review)

# QUESTIONS?

